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Biotechnology and the New Property
Regime in Human Bodies and Body Parts
REMIGIUS N. NWABUEZE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent developments in biomedical technology necessitate a
re-examination of the legal attitude toward property rights in
corpses and body parts.1 Some medical researchers in Canada, 2
Australia3 and England 4 stand accused of harvesting organs and
body parts from cadavers without the consent of living relatives.
For example, a husband, alleging a property right in the corpse of
his wife, brought an action against a research foundation for
removing her brain tissues.5 In another incident, Ashkenazi Jews
collaborated with researchers investigating Canavan's disease by
providing their bodily tissues and pedigree information. 6 When the
research results were subsequently patented, however, the
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1. See Roy Hardiman, Comment, Toward the Right of Commerciality: Recognizing
Property Rights in the Commercial Value of Human Tissue, 34 UCLA L. REV. 207, 228
(1986).
2. Charlie Gillis, Doctor Left Autopsies Unfinished in Halifax: Children's Organs
Found in Warehouse, NAT'L POST (Can.), Oct. 3, 2000, at A8.
3. Michael Perry, 'Body-parts Supermarket' Causes Uproar in Australia: No
Consent for Research, NAT'L POST (Can.), Mar. 20,2001, at A13.
4. Stephen White, The Law Relating to Dealing with Dead Bodies, 4 MED. L. INT'L
145, 145-46 (2000).
5. See Paul Waldie, Husband Sues After Brain Tissue Taken from Dead Wife,
NAT'L POST (Can.), Jan. 29, 2000, at A13.
6. See generally Peter Gorner, Parents Suing Over Patenting of Genetic Test: They
Say the Researchers They Assisted are Trying to Profit From a Test for a Rare Disease,
CHi. TRIB., Nov. 19,2000, at Al.
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research subjects complained that the patent was unfair and
amounted to a conversion of property rights in their bodily tissue.7
These allegations aggressively impugn the general proposition that
there are no property interests in corpses. 8
In contrast to the historic jurisprudence on dead bodies,9
current legal philosophy favors recognizing property rights.10 In
1992, Judge Cowen of the U.S. Court of Appeals observed,
"human remains can have significant commercial value, even
though they are not typically bought and sold like other goods.
Although remains which are used for these medical and scientific
purposes are usually donated, rather than bought and sold, this
does not negate their potential commercial value." 11 Even the
British Court of Appeals accepted that there are property interests
in the human body.12
The non-market view of the human body and tissue, without
its moral, philosophical and religious underpinnings, has been
progressively challenged. 13 Advances in biomedical technology
and research have brought the issues of property rights in human
7. Id.
8. Bernard M. Dickens, The Control of Living Body Materials, 27 U. TORONTO L.J.
142, 143 (1977).
9. Paul Matthews, Whose Body? People As Property, 36 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS.
193 (1983). Paul Matthews argued that it is possible to consider a corpse as a physical
object entitled to the characterization of property, thus affording protection of the law. Id.
Dickens, however, in a discussion of the living body and its parts, suggested: "A better
approach, therefore may be to consider the human source as having an inchoate right of
property in materials issuing from his body." Dickens, supra note 8, at 183. Earlier,
Dickens suggested that a property approach might have changed the outcome of cases like
Mokry v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. at Dallas, 592 S.W.2d 802 (1975) and Brooks v. S.
Broward Hosp. Dist., 32 So. 2d 479 (1975). Dickens, supra note 8, at 149.
10. See Matthews, supra note 9, at 198.
11. Onyeanusi v. Pan Am, 952 F.2d 788, 792 (3d. Cir. 1992). This contrasts with the
holding of Judge Stamp. He stated, "it would be a distortion of the English language to
describe the living or the dead as goods or materials." Bourne v. Norwich Crematorium
Ltd., All E.R. 576, 578 (1967) (Eng.). In the Court of Appeals decision in Moore v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., Justice Rothman observed: "Until recently, the physical
human body, as distinguished from the mental and spiritual, was believed to have little
value, other than as a source of labor. In recent history, we have seen the human body
assume astonishing aspects of value. ... For better or worse, we have irretrievably entered
an age that requires examination of our understanding of the legal rights and relationships
in the human body and the human cell." Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal.
Rptr. 494, 504 (Ct. App. 1988).
12. Dobson v. N. Tyneside Health Auth., 1 W.L.R. 596,601 (C.A. 1997).
13. See Margaret Somerville, The President, the Prime Minister, the Pope and the
Embryo, NAT'L POST (Can.), Sept. 21, 2000, at A18 (commenting on the therapeutic and
commercial usage of the human embryo and its corollary ethical question).
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bodies and tissues to the forefront. 14 These issues are important to
biomedical researchers, as well as society in general.
Governmental agencies have also expressed concerns about
how laws creating a property interest in dead human bodies and
tissue will impact biomedical research. 15 For instance, the U.S.
Office of Technology Assessment observed:
The assertion of rights by sources would affect not only the
researcher who obtained the original specimen, but perhaps
other researchers as well. Biological materials are routinely
distributed to other researchers for experimental purposes, and
scientists who obtain cell lines or other specimen-derived
products, such as gene clones, from the original researcher
could also be sued under certain legal
theories .... Furthermore, the uncertainty could affect
product developments as well as research. Since inventions
containing human tissues and cells may be patented and
licensed for commercial use, companies are unlikely to invest
heavily in developing, manufacturing, or marketing a product
when uncertainty about clear title exists.
16
This article explores the laws on dead bodies and body parts
in historical, modern and comparative contexts. In addition, it
examines how these laws accord with current scientific and
economic realities. The second section deconstructs the traditional
concepts of property and assesses the suitability of their
application to human corpses and body parts. The final section
argues that there should be a property interest in human corpses
and tissue.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON THE NO-PROPERTY RULE IN
DEAD BODIES
A historical sketch of the no-property rule in dead bodies is
necessary to appreciate the recent changes in case law on the
subject and the various suggestions outlined in this article.
A. United Kingdom
Before the early nineteenth century, British common law
14. See J.G. Castel, Legal Implications of Biomedical Science and Technology in the
Twenty-First Century, 51 CAN. B. REV. 119 (1973).
15. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr.494, 508 (LApp 1988).
16. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 493-94 (Cal. 1990) (citation
omitted).
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recognized a property interest in dead bodies.17 Old British cases
held that a creditor may arrest the body of a deceased debtor for
debts owed. 18 Implementation of the arrest was sufficient
consideration for a contract. 19 These cases demonstrate that the
British regarded a corpse as property. However, in Jones v.
Ashburnham,2° the court condemned the practice as being
"contrary to every principle of law and moral feeling." 21 By the
mid-nineteenth century, it was reasonably settled that a dead body
was not property that could be arrested in execution of a debt or
judgment.22 Consequently, in R v. Fox, 23 the court issued a
mandatory injunction against a correctional officer compelling the
release of a prisoner's corpse detained for an alleged debt. 24
While the subsequent no-property rule in dead bodies cannot
be traced with clarity, certain points are clear. The establishment
of Christianity in Britain favored burial in consecrated grounds
rather than in caves or city outskirts. 25 Ecclesiastical courts
assumed complete jurisdiction over dead bodies and applied canon
law, or religious law, as the substantive law.26 As a result, the
common law, formed in non-ecclesiastical courts, did not have the
opportunity to develop comprehensive rules on dead bodies.2
7
The common law, however, offered some criminal law
protection for buried and even unburied bodies in unconsecrated
grounds. Under the common law, it was a misdemeanor to exhume
a dead body, even for honorable reasons, without the authority of
a court.28 It was also a misdemeanor to prevent the burial of a
corpse. 29 For that purpose, the common law recognized a duty for
17. Quick v. Coppleton, 83 Eng. Rep. 349 (K.B. 1803); R. v. Cheere, 107 Eng. Rep.
1294 (K.B. 1825).
18. Cheere, 107 Eng. Rep. at 1297.
19. Quick, 83 Eng. Rep. at 349.
20. Jones v. Ashburnham, 102 Eng. Rep. 905 (K.B. 1804).
21. Id. at 909.
22. R. v. Francis Scott, 114 Eng. Rep. 97 (K.B. 1842).
23. R. v. Fox, 114 Eng. Rep. 95 (Q.B. 1841).
24. Id. at 96.
25. Andrews v. Cawthorne, 125 Eng. Rep. 1308 (C.P. 1744); Gilbert v. Buzzard, 161
Eng. Rep. 761,762 (P. 1820).
26. See generally id.; Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 14 Am. Rep. 667,
676 (1872).
27. Phillips v. Montreal Gen. Hosp., [1908] XIV La Revue Legale 159, 164.
28. R. v. Lynn, 100 Eng. Rep. 394, 394-95 (K.B. 1788); R. v. Sharpe, 169 Eng. Rep.
959, 959 (Cr. Cas. 1857).
29. R. v. Feist, 169 Eng. Rep. 1132, 1133 (Cr. Cas. 1858); R. v. Hunter 1 W.L.R. 95, 98
(C.A. 1974) (Eng.); Michael Hirst, Preventing the Lawful Burial of a Body, 1996 CRIM. L.
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certain people, namely executors, administrators, occupiers of
buildings and next of kin, to bury a deceased person.30 Beyond
this, the common law did not provide any civil remedy to the
relatives of a deceased person for the indignities that might be
inflicted upon a corpse.31 The common law no-property rule in
dead bodies is most clearly espoused by William Blackstone who
said, "[t]hough the heir has a property interest in the monuments
and escutcheons of his ancestors, he has none in their bodies or
ashes; nor can he bring any civil action... against their bodies or
ashes or violate their remains."
32
Although Blackstone has been criticized for his etymological
quibbling of the Latin word 'cadaver,' 33 his proposition articulated
a rule that lasted nearly 200 years and settled many cases in the
United Kingdom.34 Recently, this has been diluted by exceptions
introduced by the British courts in Dobson v. North Tyneside
Health Authority3 5 and R. v. Kelly.36
B. Canada
Though Canada, like most other common law countries, was
politically dependent on the United Kingdom, it did not have
state-established ecclesiastical courts.37  This provided an
opportunity to adopt a radical and different approach to the
British law that was formulated in the context of an ecclesiastical
jurisdiction.38 The opportunity was not seized, however, as some
court rulings in Canada remained faithful to the British no-
property rule.39 For example, in Davidson v. Garrett, the plaintiff
brought an action for damages against some practicing physicians
REV. 96,99 (1996).
30. R. v. Stewart, 113 Eng. Rep. 1007 (K.B. 1840).
31. Williams v. Williams, 20 W.L.R. 659, 663-64 (Ch. D. 1882) (Eng.).
32. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 429 (U.
of Chi. Press 1979).
33. R. F. Martin, Annotation, Removal and Reinternment of Remains, 21 A.L.R. 2d
472,480 (1952).
34. See Williams v. Williams, 20 W.L.R. 659 (Ch. D. 1882) (Eng.); R. v. Sharpe 169
Eng. Rep. 959 (Cr. Cas. 1857); P.D.G. Skegg, The "No Property" Rule and Rights
Relating to Dead Bodies, 5 TORT L. REV. 222,229 (1997).
35. Dobson v. N. Tyneside Health Auth., 1 W.L.R. 596 (C.A. 1997) (Eng.).
36. R. v. Kelly, 3 All E. R. 741 (C.A. 1988) (Eng.).
37. See Phillips v. Montreal Gen. Hosp., [1908] La Revue Legale 159, 164. See also
Miner v. C.P.R. [19111 Alta. L.R. 408,413.
38. Id.
39. See Davidson v. Garrett [1899] C.C.C. 200,203.
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for conducting an unauthorized dissection on his deceased wife's
body.40 The defendants justified the act based on the authority of a
post-mortem direction given orally by the coroner. 41 Though the
case turned on the legality of the oral direction given by the
coroner, the court nevertheless held that:
[T]he cutting and mutilating of the dead body of the plaintiff's
wife are alleged in aggravation of the damages which the
plaintiff seeks to recover for the alleged trespass, probably
because, according to the law of England as introduced into this
Province, there is no property in a dead body, and a trespass
cannot be committed in respect of it.
42
1. Possession and Custody Rights
In 1930, in Edmonds v. Armstrong Funeral Home,43 the
Alberta Supreme Court accepted the British no-property rule with
its narrow exception for possession and custody rights for burial.44
In Edmonds, the undertaker, who was hired by the plaintiff to
bury his wife, conspired with surgeons to harvest organs from the
body of the corpse.4 5 The court referred to the British decisions
and upheld the no-property rule.46 The court held, however, that
the defendants' acts were an interference with the plaintiff's right
of possession and custody in his deceased wife's body for burial.
4 7
In contrast, Quebec adopted a contrary rule recognizing the
existence of a property right in a dead body.4 8 This emanates from
the decision in Phillips v. Montreal General Hospital,49 where a
widow of the deceased claimed damages against the defendant for
conducting an unauthorized autopsy on the deceased's body.50 In
Phillips, the British decisions were confined to their historical
context and guidance was sought from the more revolutionary U.S.
40. Id. at 202-03.
41. ld. at 203.
42. Id. at 202-03.
43. Edmonds v. Armstrong Funeral Home Ltd., [1931] D.L.R. 676.
44. Id. at 680.
45. Id. at 681.
46. Id. at 680.
47. Id.
48. See Phillips, [1908] XIV La Revue Legale at 165 (holding that widow had a cause
of action against defendant who performed unauthorized autopsy on deceased husband's
body).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 160.
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cases on point. 51 The court observed that:
[U]nder the civil law a person may, during his life, dispose of his
remains in whole or part, so long as the disposition does not
offend against public order or police regulations. Thus, he
might will his body to a school of anatomy....In the absence of
personal directions, the remains are the property of the family,
just as is the body of an animal.
52
2. Damages
A similar radical approach was taken in the Alberta case of
Miner v. C.P.R.53 The plaintiff brought an action for damages for
mental distress arising from the defendant's negligence in delaying
delivery of the corpse of plaintiff's son.54 The defendant
contracted to transport the corpse from British Columbia to
Alberta. 55 The defendant argued that the plaintiff had no cause of
action because there was no property interest in a corpse. 56 The
trial judge extensively reviewed the old British authorities on point
and concluded that they were based on weak precedent and
juristic authority.57 The court found the absence of ecclesiastical
jurisdiction in Canada as further ground to depart from the British
decisions. 58 Consequently, the court held "the law recognises [a]
property [interest] in a corpse" 59 and, therefore, awarded both
special and general damages to the plaintiff.60 On appeal, however,
the court addressed the issue of whether general damages for
mental distress were permitted. 61 The court set aside the award of
general damages for mental distress on the grounds that it was not
accompanied by any physical harm.
62
In Mason v. Westside Cemeteries,63 an Ontario court held
that damages were recoverable even in the absence of physical
51. Id. at 161-164.
52. Id.
53. Miner, [1911] Alta. L.R. at 408.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 409.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 409-13.
58. Id. at413.
59. Id. at 413-14.
60. Id. at 417.
61. Id. at 418.
62. Id. at 419-22. This distinction bedeviled U.S. jurisprudence for years. Id. at 419.
63. Mason v. Westside Cemeteries Ltd., [1996] D.L.R. 361.
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harm.64 In Mason, the defendant negligently lost urns containing
cremated remains of the plaintiff's parents.65 The plaintiff
successfully claimed damages in both bailment and negligence, but
only nominal damages were awarded.66 This case provided useful
insight into the court's treatment of the no-property rule. Though
the court affirmed the general British rule that there was no
property interest in a dead body,67 the court found in favor of
bailment. As the learned judge correctly stated, 68 bailment is a
legal cause of action that seeks to redress the plaintiff's property
rights in a thing in possession of a bailer.69 Consequently, a
bailment cause of action does not aid a plaintiff except when a
property right is implicated.70 In finding for the plaintiff on
bailment, the judge paradoxically or implicitly accepted the
existence of a property right in a corpse or human remains. 71
As illustrated, while some Canadian courts remain faithful to
the British no-property rule, it does not justify arguing that the
Canadian decisions reflect an unwavering application of the
British rule.
3. Criminal Statutes
Apart from the civil law protections given to a dead body,
Canada has a well-defined criminal law provision intended to
protect the dignity of a corpse. 72 Section 182 of the Canadian
Criminal Code 73 states that:
[e]very one who neglects, without lawful excuse, to perform any
duty that is imposed on him by law or that he undertakes with
reference to the burial of a dead human body or human
remains, or improperly or indecently interferes with or offers
any indignity to a dead human body or human remains, whether
64. See id. at 380.
65. See id. at 364.
66. Id. at 382.
67. Id. at 368.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 369.
70. See id. at 367.
71. Id. "At first blush it may seem odd to apply the principles of bailment to a
situation involving the burial of a dead person's remains in a cemetery. One does not
normally think of a cemetery owner as being the bailee of all of the bodies buried in the
cemetery. On reflection, however, I have come to the conclusion that there is a
relationship of bailment created in these situations." Id. at 368.
72. Criminal Code [Crim. Code], R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 182 (1985) (Can.).
73. Id.
[Vol. 24:19
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buried or not, is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years. 74
Although this Section does not literally or expressly refer to
the prevention of burial, which is a misdemeanor under common
law, the terms are broad enough to cover cases of preventing
burial.75 This linguistic construction is more apparent and
compelling when the next-of-kin, who is entitled to the disposition
of the corpse, prevents burial. In that case, it is a breach of duty
under Section 182(a). 76 Problems of interpretation arise when a
third party, who owes no duty to the corpse, 77 prevents burial.
78
Preventing the burial of a deceased person is an interference and
indignity to a human corpse under Section 182(b).
79
The Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Moyei8 ° interpreted
Section 182(b). 81 The accused, a white supremacist and neo-Nazi,
committed indignities to corpses buried in a Jewish cemetery.82
This was done by taking photographs depicting a simulated
urination on one of the gravestones and an exhibition of a male
genital organ on another gravestone. 83 The accused argued that
the standard under Section 182(b) was not met because the
indignity resulted from a photographic depiction without physical
interference with the buried corpses.
84
The court dismissed the argument and held that physical
interference, though a sufficient element of the offense, was not
necessary for its commission.85 The court also considered
immaterial the fact that the indignity was offered to the
gravestones marking the remains instead of the remains
themselves. 86 The court did, however, emphasize that there must
be human remains beneath the gravestone. Thus, if a gravestone
74. Id. at 108-109.
75. Id. at 109. See also R. v. Hunter, 1 Law Reports 95, 98 (Q.B. 1974).
76. Id. at 108.
77. See Hunter, 1 Law Reports at 97 (Q.B. 1974) (discussing where the accused
persons, as friends of the deceased and all under twenty years old, hid the deceased's body
after she died in the course of horseplay).
78. Id.
79. Crim. Code, ch. C-34, § 182(b).
80. R. v. Moyer, [1994] S.C.R. 899.
81. Id. at 907-09.
82. Id. at 902.
83. Id. at 902-03.
84. See id. at 900.
85. Id. at 906-07.
86. Id.
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was erected some distance from the human remains, any indignity
toward such a gravestone would not be an offense under this
section.87
C. United States of America
From the beginning, U.S. courts openly showed their aversion
to the British no-property rule because of its conceivable injustice
to a plaintiff whose dead relative's body was the object of abuse or
desecration by a defendant. 88 Most U.S. courts have made
advantageous use of their non-ecclesiastical history, which was
traditionally used as a basis for rejection of the ecclesiastically-
influenced British rule. 89 The U.S. courts of equity assumed
jurisdiction over dead bodies and were prepared to grant relief.90
Consequently, a probate court did not have jurisdiction to
entertain an action on the interment and re-interment of a dead
body because a corpse "forms no part of the estate" 91 of a
deceased person.
In Ritter v. Couch,92 the court made a forceful declaration
representative of the U.S. judicial sentiment and aversion to the
British rule:9
3
The dogma of the English ecclesiastical law, that a child has no
such claim, no such exclusive power, no peculiar interest in the
dead body of its parent, is so utterly inconsistent with every
enlightened perception of personal right, so inexpressibly
repulsive to every proper moral sense, that its adoption would
be an eternal disgrace to American jurisprudence. 94
U.S. courts were challenged in finding a legal basis to grant a
remedy. 95 Confusion, inconsistent approaches and legal fictions
demonstrate the severity of this problem in numerous U.S. cases
on the subject. 96 The best practicable and analytical approach is to
87. See id. at 906-09.
88. See generally Martin, supra note 33, at 482.
89. See Martin, supra note 33, at 481.
90. See Martin, supra note 33, at 476; Home Undertaking Co. v. Joliff, 19 P.2d 654,
656 (1933); See Glatzer v. Dinerman, 59 A.2d 242,243 (1948).
91. Fischer's Estate v. Fischer, 117 N.E.2d 855, 859 (1954).
92. Ritter v. Couch, 76 S.E. 428,430 (W. Va. 1912).
93. Id. at 430.
94. Id.
95. See generally id. at 432-33.
96. See Michelle B. Bray, Note, Personalizing Personalty: Toward a Property Right in
Human Bodies, 69 TEX. L. REV. 209,220 (1990).
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treat the various methods adopted by U.S. courts under some
general categories. 97 For example, a remedy based on trespass to
land presented no problem because it usually involved the
desecration of the corpse of a plaintiff's relative, that was buried
on land owned by the plaintiff or where the plaintiff had
recognizable title.
98
1. Claims Based in Tort
A widely used method relating to dead bodies were claims
based in tort. 99 Tort claims, however, lacked consistency. This
resulted in five distinct causes of action: intentional infliction of
emotional distress, 100 intentional mishandling of a dead body,1° 1
abuse of a dead body,10 2 negligent infliction of emotional or
mental distress10 3 and negligent or wrongful interference with a
dead body. 104
The first three causes of action are similar, requiring a
plaintiff to prove outrageous, willful or wanton conduct by the
defendant before liability can be attached. 10 5 The plaintiff is also
required to show that he or she was the immediate focus of the
defendant's outrageous conduct. 10 6 In other words, the plaintiff
must be aware of the defendant's outrageous conduct. 10 7
These requirements make these causes of action unattractive
to a plaintiff. For example, some courts held the requirements
were not met when the defendant's conduct was merely
negligent, 10 8 where the alleged desecration was done in execution
of public policy embodied in a statute10 9 or where the defendant
97. See id.
98. See Meagher v. Driscoll, 99 Mass. 281, 284-85 (1868); Thirkfield v. Mountain
View Cemetery Ass'n, 41 P. 564, 565 (Utah 1895).
99. See Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 359,
386 (2000).
100. Jaynes v. Strong-Thorne Mortuary, Inc., 954 P.2d 45, 50 (N.M. 1997).
101. Culpepper v. Pearl St. Bldg., Inc., 877 P.2d 877,879 (Colo. 1994).
102. Carney v. Knollwood Cemetery Ass'n, 514 N.E.2d 430,432 (Ohio 1986).
103. Janicki v. Hosp. of St. Raphael, 744 A.2d 963, 967 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999); Wallin
v. Univ. of Cincinnati Hosp., 698 N.E.2d 530, 531 (Ohio 1998); Green v. S. Transplant
Serv., Inc., 698 So. 2d 699,700 (La. 1997).
104. Ramirez v. Health Partners of S. Ariz., 972 P.2d 658, 665-66 (Ariz. 1998).
105. Christensen v. Super. Ct., 820 P.2d 181,202 (Cal. 1991).
106. Id. at 202-03. This requirement is criticized by Justice Mosk. Id. at 204.
107. Id. at 203.
108. Culpepper v. Pearl St. Bldg., Inc., 877 P.2d 877,883 (Colo. 1994).
109. See Ramirez, 972 P.2d at 658; Wallin v. Univ. 'of Cincinnati Hosp., 698 N.E. 530
(Ohio 1998).
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atoned for his wrongdoing by pre-litigation compensation to the
plaintiff. 110 As a result, a plaintiff, offended by the abuse of the
dead body of a relative, was left without a remedy, even though a
remedy was theoretically available in U.S. jurisprudence. 1 1
Under negligent infliction of emotional distress, there is no
comprehensive protection to a plaintiff.112 To recover for this tort,
some U.S. jurisdictions require that damages for emotional distress
be accompanied by a contemporaneous physical or pecuniary
loss.1
13
Because a plaintiff complaining of the desecration of a dead
relative's body rarely suffers a physical harm or pecuniary loss,114
he or she is left at the mercy of this anomalous rule.115 While some
jurisdictions allowed recovery without proof of physical and
pecuniary loss, they often limited the class of potential plaintiffs by
imposing the "bystanders rule," which required a plaintiff to
witness injury to a third party.116
Because there is no uniform practice among U.S. courts,117
the plaintiff has to ascertain whether his or her jurisdiction
recognizes such a remedy. If not, he or she might be left without a
remedy. Thus, a cause of action based on the negligent infliction
110. Jaynes v. Strong-Thorne Mortuary Inc., 954 P.2d 50 (N.M. 1998).
111. See generallydk.
112. See Criswell v. Brentwood Hosp., 551 N.E.2d 1315, 1318 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989).
113. Sanford v. Ware, 60 S.E.2d 10, 14 (Va. Ct. App. 1950); Criswell, 551 N.E.2d at
1318.
114. Cf. Sanford, 60 S.E. at 11 (finding that plaintiff, in addition to mental distress,
incurred additional expenses in engaging another undertaker to carry out the re-interment
of her deceased husband).
115. See Allen v. Jones, 163 Cal. Rptr. 445 (Ct. App. 1980). The defendant negligently
lost in transit the remains of the plaintiff's deceased brother. Id. at 447. The court held
that the plaintiff could recover for mental distress unaccompanied by any physical harm.
Id. at 450. In a trenchant criticism of the distinction between damages accompanied by
physical loss and others not so accompanied, Justice Gardner observed that the
"distinction is not only gossamer, it is whimsical." Id. at 451.
116. Janicki v. Hosp. of St. Raphael, 744 A.2d 963, 973-74 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999);
Christensen v. Super. Ct., 820 P.2d 181, 209 (Cal. 1991).
117. As a U.S. court observed: "When we reach the question as to whether mental
pain or suffering is a proper element of damages in such cases the courts are in hopeless
conflict. Upon the principle, prevailing in some jurisdictions, that mental pain and
suffering alone do not constitute a basis for the recovery of substantial damages, some
courts deny a recovery for mental suffering, unaccompanied by pecuniary loss, where the
wrongful act of the defendant amounts to mere negligence. Others take the opposite view.
In a third class of cases a recovery is allowed for mental pain and suffering alone resulting
from a wrongful act which is willful or wanton or amounts to gross negligence." Sanford,
60 S.E.2d at 12-13.
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of emotional distress hardly provides a plaintiff with adequate
remedy. Therefore, plaintiffs have sought alternative recourse by
way of the legal fiction of quasi-property.1 18
2. Concept of Quasi-Property in a Dead Body
Because of such difficulties with tort claims, plaintiffs and
U.S. courts often resort to the concept of quasi-property in a
corpse. 119 Many times, the intent is to avoid the requirements of
proving willful or wanton conduct by the defendant or the similar
problem of proving accompanying physical or pecuniary loss. 120
The concept of quasi-property is an ingenious invention by
U.S. courts to help a deserving plaintiff.121 It is a legal fiction 122
because it has no relationship with property in the legal sense. 123 It
merely embodies the next-of-kin's sepulchral rights, which are not
based in property, such as the right to possession and custody of
the corpse for burial. 124 It also gives a right to determine the time,
place and manner of burial and to have the deceased delivered to
the next-of-kin in the same way as it was when life left it.125
In contrast, application of the concept of quasi-property has
been used in both a jurisdictional and remedial sense. 126 It has
proven to be a handy jurisdictional device to grant standing to a
plaintiff. 127 A strict application of the British no-property rule
denies standing where a plaintiff does not suffer any detriment by
the desecration of property he has no right to. In Ritter v. Couch,
the U.S. quasi-property concept recognizes that a plaintiff has an
analogous property interest in a dead body that, if desecrated,
would give him or her standing. 128
In Ritter, the plaintiffs objected to the defendant's acquisition
118. Carney v. Knollwood Cemetary Ass'n, 514 N.E.2d 430,434 (Ohio 1986).
119. Id.
120. See Rao, supra note 99, at 385-86.
121. Id. at 385.
122. See generally Carney, 514 N.E.2d at 434.
123. See Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 14 Am. Rep. 667, 676-77 (R.I.
1872).
124. Whitehair v. Highland Memory Gardens, 327 S.E.2d 438, 441 (W. Va. 1985);
Diebler v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 92 N.Y.S.2d 356, 358 (N.Y. App. Div.
1949).
125. Whitehair, 327 S.E.2d at 441.
126. Id. at 440-41.
127. Id. at 438.
128. See, e.g., Ritter, 76 S.E. at 428.
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of an old cemetery containing their relatives' burial sites.129 Since
the plaintiffs did not pay for the burial plots and merely had a
license to bury their relatives there, the defendant contended the
plaintiffs had no standing.130 The court, using the quasi-property
concept, held that the plaintiffs had standing. According to the
court, "while a dead body is not property in the strict sense of the
common law, it is a quasi-property, over which the relatives of the
deceased have rights which our courts of equity will protect."
'131
The use of the quasi-property concept occurs more in the
remedial context. 132 This concept is usually a last resort when a
plaintiff's tort claim fails for the reasons already given. Thus, in
Blanchard v. Brawley,133 the court held that Louisiana law did not
allow recovery of damages on account of a third party's injury
134
and instead, resorted to the general rule of quasi-property to find
for the plaintiffs. 135 The remedial or substantive use of the concept
was also evident in most of the cases cited.
The concept of quasi-property is not an adequate remedy for
a plaintiff. Arguably, this concept avails only the closest next-of-
kin with the result that a more distant relative (e.g., a grandchild)
is denied standing. 136 In limited jurisdictions, standing has been
recognized for more distant relatives as in Carney v. Knollwood
Cemetery Association.1
37
While some U.S. courts have shown the greatest
accommodation to a plaintiff, using the quasi-property concept,
others have refused to resort to this concept when the plaintiff is
129. Id. at 428-29.
130. Id. at 429.
131. ld. at 430.
132. Blanchard v. Brawley, 75 So. 2d 891, 893 (La. Ct. App. 1954).
133. Id. at 891.
134. Id. at 893.
135. Id.
136. Carney, 514 N.E.2d at 433. Cf. Christensen v. Super. Ct., 820 P.2d 181 (Cal. 1991).
This case held that a funeral service contract was made for the benefit of all family
members, not just the contracting family member, with the exception of unborn family
members or those who were not aware of the decedent's death or the nature of the funeral
contract. Id. Consequently, the majority held that all the family members for whose
benefit a funeral service contract was made were entitled to or had standing to sue for the
negligent infliction of mental distress as a result of the desecration of a deceased relative's
body. Id. Justice Kennard, however, was prepared to limit the right of standing to only
those family members statutorily entitled to control the disposition of a deceased relative.
Id. at 206-07. Other family members, according to Justice Kennard, would have to show
that they witnessed the deceased's desecration. Id. at 207, 213.
137. Carney, 514 N.E.2d at 435.
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required to show pure ownership or a right to possession, as in
actions for conversion or detinue. 138 In such cases, the quasi-
property concept is stripped of its fictional property
characteristics.13
9
For instance, in Crocker v. Pleasant,140 the plaintiffs asserted
an infringement of their due process right under the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and failed. 141 Similarly, in
Keyes v. Konkel,142 the plaintiff's possessory claim of a relative's
dead body, allegedly detained by an undertaker, also failed.143
The court in Keyes observed that "no return of the property can
be ordered in case of the replevin of a dead body"'144 and that the
concept of quasi-property did not apply to "damage to the corpse
as property, but rather damage to the next of kin by infringement
of his right to have the body delivered to him for burial.'145 Also,
in Culpepper v. Pearl St. Bldg. Inc.,146 the plaintiffs used the
concept to argue conversion of their son's corpse due to mistaken
cremation by the defendant. 147 The court rejected "the fictional
theory that a property right exists in a dead body which would
support an action for conversion." 148
U.S. courts also found the quasi-property concept
unfavorable in an organ donation context because it subjects organ
procurement officers to liability in circumstances that vitiate the
'gift of life' laws. 149 In Green v. Southern Transplant Service
138. See Rao, supra note 99, at 382.
139. See generally id. at 382-87; Ritter, 76 S.E. 428; Blanchard, 75 So. 2d 891; Carney,
514 N.E.2d 430; Crocker v. Pleasant, 727 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Keyes v.
Konkel, 78 N.W. 649 (Mich. 1899); Culpepper v. Pearl St. Bldg., Inc., 877 P.2d 877 (these
sources show how the concept of quasi-property was stripped of its fictional
characteristics).
140. Crocker, 727 So. 2d at 1087.
141. Id. at 1089.
142. Keyes, 78 N.W. at 649.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Culpepper, 877 P.2d at 877.
147. Id. at 880.
148. Id. at 882.
149. Ramirez v. Health Partners of S. Ariz., 972 P.2d 658 (Ariz. 1998); State v. Powell,
497 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 1986). In the same circumstance, a similar claim was held to be valid
in Brotherton v Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1991), Whaley v. County of Saginaw, 941
F. Supp. 1483 (E.D. Mich. 1996), and Dampier v. Wayne County, 592 N.W.2d 809 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1999). However, Crocker v. Pleasant, 727 So. 2d 1087, 1089 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1999) held that the ratio in Brotherton was contrary to the holding in Powell.
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Inc.,150 the plaintiff's quasi-property claim was upheld even though
it involved harvesting the deceased's bone and tissue for
transplantation. 15 1 Unlike in Ramirez v. Health Partners of S.
Ariz.,152 where defendants merely went beyond plaintiff's
authorization to harvest additional tissue, 153 the plaintiffs in Green
did not give authorization and the defendants did not plead
immunity under the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act. 154
In conclusion, most U.S. court decisions are revolutionary in
their use of the quasi-property concept as a significant basis for
U.S. law on dead bodies even though this concept does not offer
comprehensive protection to a plaintiff. The continuing debate on
this subject and its potential solutions, tend to obviate the defects
currently used in tort-based causes of action. As such, the
suggested solution found in the American Restatement of Law 2d,
Torts, 274, becomes relevant. 155
3. American Restatement of Law 2d, Torts
Section 868 of the Restatement sets out the cause of action
for interference with dead bodies and provides:
One who intentionally, recklessly, or negligently removes,
withholds, mutilates or operates upon a body of a dead person
or prevents its proper interment or cremation is subject to
liability to a member of the family of the deceased who is
entitled to the disposition of the body. 156
This proposed section condenses all tort and quasi-property
forms of action into a single cause of action.157 This Section,
however, renounced the onerous requirements associated with the
actions already discussed. 158 For example, a plaintiff seeking
damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress from a
desecration of a dead relative's body could file suit under Section
868, which would not require proof of a contemporaneous physical
150. Green, 698 So. 2d at 699.
151. Id. at 701.
152. Ramirez, 972 P.2d at 658.
153. Id. at 660.
154. Green, 698 So. 2d at 700.
155. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: INTERFERENCE WITH DEAD BODIES § 868
(1982).
156. Id.
157. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: INTERFERENCE WITH DEAD BODIES § 868
cmt. a (1982).
158. Id.
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or pecuniary loss, willful and wanton conduct by the defendant or
the existence of a quasi-property right to the corpse. 159 This
interpretation is supported by Wallin v. University of Cincinnati
Hospital.160
Although Section 868 was a lethal weapon for plaintiffs, it was
not a statute and did not bind the courts.161 Additionally, Section
868 represented a minority view, especially where applied in an
organ donation context, or where its application would be onerous
on a defendant whose conduct was almost without reproach.
162
The result was that in the rejected cases, the courts still required
the plaintiff to prove the onerous requirements under causes of
action already discussed.
163
This Section also restricted recovery and standing to "a
member of the family of the deceased who is entitled to the
disposition of the body."'164 Under present priority rules in the
United States, the surviving spouse, in the absence of the
deceased's direction, has the right of disposition against other
members of the deceased's family.165 Where the decedent had a
surviving spouse and children, only the spouse would have
standing and a right to recover. 166 This would be unfair to family
members who might not have a right to the disposition of the
deceased's body, but nevertheless suffered no less mental pain and
distress than the person with a right to disposition. Close associates
of the deceased, also severely distressed by the deceased's
desecration, are beyond the contemplation of Section 868.167
Based on these considerations, a later amendment to the
Restatement Second removed the limitation on standing and
159. Id.
160. Wallin, 698 N.E.2d at 531.
161. Ramirez v. Health Partners of S. Ariz., 972 P.2d 658, 665 (Ariz. 1998).
162. Id. See also Culpepper v. Pearl St. Bldg., Inc., 877 P.2d 877, 881 (Colo. 1994);
Wallin, 698 N.E.2d at 532.
163. Ramirez, 972 P.2d at 663; Culpepper, 877 P.2d at 881; Wallin, 698 N.E.2d at 432.
164. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: INTERFERENCE WITH DEAD BODIES § 868
(1982).
165. Felipe v. Vega, 570 A.2d 1028, 1030 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1989).
166. Id.
167. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: INTERFERENCE WITH DEAD BODIES §
868 (1982). But see Christensen v. Super. Ct., 820 P.2d 181, 206 (Cal. 1991). The
dissenting opinion of Justice Mosk held that a close business associate of the deceased
should be allowed to recover for infliction of emotional distress resulting from the abuse
of the deceased's body. Id.
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recovery by family members. 168
Lastly, if Section 868 represents a synthesis of the various
causes of action, then its semantic formula presents difficulties for
interpreting and seeking a remedy. In other words, a strict literal
construction of the Section would limit its application to cases of
physical interference with a dead body.169  For example, an
unjustified exhibition of a decedent's autopsy picture would not
come within the terms of the Section. 170
Florida's District Court of Appeals confronted a similar
problem in Wi1iams v. City of Minneola171 which was a case of
first impression. There, the investigating police officers took
pictures and videotape of the anatomical examination during an
autopsy of the plaintiff's deceased child who died suspiciously. 172
The pictures and videotape, which were disseminated to non-
members of the police team in a private gathering and later
published in a newspaper, captured the plaintiffs' attention. 173 The
plaintiffs brought an action for damages for the negligent infliction
of emotional distress and tortious interference with a dead
body. 174 Though the majority found for the plaintiff for negligent
infliction of emotional distress, it held that a cause of action for
interference with a dead body was not proved under Section 868.
The court held:
[In] theory [interference with a dead body] must fail simply
because the appellees did not interfere with a dead body. An
invariable component of the tort is some action affecting the
physical body itself, such as removing it, withholding it,
mishandling it, mutilating it, or preventing its proper burial....
Publication of a photograph of a body does not, in the absence
of a showing of actionable trespass on the body as such, amount
to an interference with the possessory or burial rights of
another. 175
168. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: INTERFERENCE WITH DEAD BODIES §
868, reporter's note 75 (1982).
169. Similarly, Justice Whitbeck observed: "[A] cognizable claim for the mutilation of
a dead body is not sufficiently broad to encompass a claim for its decomposition, which
does not involve the active incision, dismemberment, or evisceration of the body.
Dampier v. Wayne County, 592 N.W.2d 809,816 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
170. Williams v. City of Minneola, 575 So. 2d 683,695 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 685-86.
173. See id. at 686.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 688-89 (citations omitted).
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Thus, the majority interpreted Section 868 to establish a
single tort, but held that the element of physical interference was
lacking. 176 Justice Griffin's dissent held that an unjustified
publication of a decedent's autopsy picture was interference within
the terms of Section 868.177 This minority judgment is more
likeable if we retain the advantages of the Section as establishing a
single tort embodying the positive sides of the previous categories
and renouncing the obstacles. These advantages will be lost in an
interpretation that imposes a requirement of physical interference
with a dead body. That requirement will limit the reach of this
Section. Interestingly, the Supreme Court of Canada again held,
in R v. Moyer,178 that physical interference with a corpse was not a
necessary element of interfering with a dead body under the
Canadian Criminal Code.
179
Physical interference may not be the basis of a cause of action
as recognized by Section 868 and illustrated in Finn v. City of New
York.180 In Finn, the plaintiff suffered mental anguish when the
City of New York, due to a lapse in its system for reporting deaths,
failed to notify the plaintiff of her husband's death until eight days
after his demise. 181 Meanwhile, the deceased was deposited in a
morgue under the control of the city.182 There was no question of
physical abuse or any indignity inflicted upon the dead body; the
cause of action was based on negligent withholding of the death
information. 183 This case, however, was not treated significantly
different from cases of tortious withholding of a dead body, and
Justice Sullivan observed:
But what of a situation where, as here, the anguish and torment
were caused not by withholding the body but by withholding
the fact of death. It is a fact that throughout the eight days of
her husband's disappearance, plaintiff nurtured the hope and
belief that he was still alive; she had no knowledge that he was
dead and that his corpse was at the morgue in the custody of the
City. Thus, her anguish was the result not of being deprived of
the possession of his remains for proper burial, an injury which
176. See id.
177. Id. at 695-96.
178. R. v. Moyer, [19941 S.C.R. 899.
179. Id. at 908.
180. See generally Finn v. City of New York, 335 N.Y.S.2d 516 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1972).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 520.
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
for its existence must be based on knowledge of the fact that
death has occurred, but of not knowing of such occurrence. If
the principle that one may not tortiously withhold a deceased's
body is to have efficacy, then the law must recognize as a
corollary thereof, and this Court so holds, that one may not
tortiously withhold notification of death.
184
Though this case was not decided under Section 868, or even
explicitly cited, the court suggested that the ratio should inspire its
interpretation. 185 It showed the futility of the distinction between
emotional distresses resulting from physical interference versus
non-physical interference that, nevertheless, might be of "much
greater severity." 186 The intent of the law was to provide a remedy
for emotional distress resulting from unjustifiable actions toward a
dead body. 187 Limiting a remedy to cases of physical interference
with a corpse detracted from this laudable legal objective. 188
The result is that approaches and solutions with regard to the
law on dead bodies are still very much unsettled in U.S.
jurisprudence, as in most other places of the world. This puts the
current debate in proper perspective. Although the quasi-property
concept provides some succor to a plaintiff by finding for a full
property interest in a dead body or tissue, it may not provide the
desired global protection to a plaintiff. Can a full property rule
provide an escape from the defects already inherent in the current
legal categories or forms of action? What will be the conceptual
framework for finding a full property right in a human body? Is
184. Id. at 521.
185. See id.
186. Id. at 522.
187. See id.
188. Wallin v. Univ. of Cincinnati Hosp., 698 N.E.2d 530, 531-32 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1998).
The law is gradually de-emphasizing the fact of physical interference as a basis for a cause
of action relating to a dead body. In one case, the mental distress resulted mainly from the
publication of a false report of the deceased's HIV status. Id. at 531. There was no
physical abuse of the deceased's body. See id. at 532-33. The court held, however, that the
plaintiffs failed to prove defendant's negligence or that the defendant was responsible for
the publication of the false report in that case. Id. In another case, the mental distress
resulted from the defendant's negligence in not notifying plaintiffs of the death of their
son, who was found dead in Florida and buried by the defendant without adequate
notification of the plaintiff/parents. Crocker v. Pleasant, 727 So. 2d 1087, 1088 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1999). The court held that a prima facie case for tortious interference with a dead
body was made. Id. at 1089. The plaintiffs, however, did not claim the tort but, instead,
brought a constitutional claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 1088. The court
held that the property element of the Fourteenth Amendment was not established and,
therefore, affirmed the lower court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claim on this issue. Id. at 1089.
[Vol. 24:19
New Property Regime in Human Body Parts
our global community ready for such a legal perspective, and what
are the bases of possible objection to the objectification of the
human body? Does recent technology justify a finding of a full
property interest in a dead body or human tissue?
III. THE DOMINANT PARADIGMS OF PROPERTY
It is possible to posit various models of property, but there are
two dominant senses in which the word 'property' is understood: a
physical or tangible thing, which is the reified perspective, and a
bundle of rights.189
A. The Reified Perspective of Property
Generally, a person is said to own or have property rights in a
thing that belongs to that person, such as a chair, book, car or pen.
This is referred to as the reified perspective of property because it
targets or looks at the thing itself.190 This is the way that most
writers of the last century and before understood property.191
Strahan, writing in 1895, observed:
[O]nly things which can be owned are determinate things, that
is, an actually existing physical object .... We cannot in this
sense own a debt, or a patent, or a copyright, all of which are
mere creations of the law, without any physical embodiments
over which physical power can be exercised. Accordingly,
189. A third, less dominant model of property, is known as the personhood conception
of property. This view sees property as the embodiment or extension of a person's
personality. Therefore, on this perspective, property is entitled to the best protection by
law. See Margaret J. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 959-60
(1982); TASLIM 0. ELIAS, THE NATURE OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 169-70
(Manchester Univ. Press 1956). Applying the personhood analysis to the human body, it is
argued that since the human body is most representative of a person's identity and sense
of being, it therefore qualifies as property and is entitled to legal protection on that basis.
Bray, supra note 96, at 215 (1990). If property, however, is a mere embodiment or
extension of one's personality, then it is doubtful whether it will satisfy the criteria of
identifiably, permanence and transferability, which are the hallmarks of a property
interest. The personhood analysis also seriously questions the general view that property
deals with the legal relationship between a person and an object. Jeremy Waldron, What
Is Private Property? 5 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 313 (1985); Michael A. Heller, The
Dynamic Analytics of Property, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 79 (2001); Daphna
Lewinsohn-Zamir, Comment, Contemporary Property Law Scholarship, 2 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES IN L. 97 (2001); Hanoch Dagan and Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons,
110 YALE L.J. 549 (2001).
190. Douglas Litowitz, Reification in Law and Legal Theory, 9 S. CA. INTERDIS. L.J.
401,401 (2000).
191. Id. at 403-405.
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strictly speaking, such rights are not property .... 192
John Locke, 193 John Austin' 94 and William Blackstone195
espoused the reified perspective of property. The basis that the
above perspective restricted property to physical and tangible
things was its theoretical anchorage in control and dominion over
a thing or the ability to alter the original nature of a thing by the
expenditure of labor.196 The principle is that once control or
dominion exists over a thing, or alters it from its original naturally
occurring state, then it was your property.
197
This idea of control and alteration led Locke to postulate that
every person had a proprietary interest in his or her body. He said:
[T]hough the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all
men, yet every man has a property in his person: this no body
has any right to but himself. The labour of his body, and the
work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever
then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, left
it in, he hath mixed his labour with and joined to it something
that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by
him removed from the common state nature hath placed it in, it
hath by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the
common right of other men. For this labour being the
unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can
have a right to what that is once joined to.19 8 (emphasis added).
Locke's statement could be a foundation for a property right
in a human body. But his statement was based on a declining
theory of property (i.e., control, dominion or alteration of a thing)
and was not generally shared by writers who addressed the topic
192. JAMES ANDREW STRAHAN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY
(Stevens & Sons, Ltd. 2d ed. 1897)(1895).
193. See generally JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (Thomas
P. Peardon, ed., The Liberal Arts Press, Inc..1952).
194. See generally JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED
(John Murray ed., 1863).
195. See generally WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND (U. of Chi. Press 1979).
196. See LOCKE, supra note 193 at 17.
197. As Strahan rationalized: "Material things, however, of which physical possession
has been taken by no one, are the property of no one (res nullius). Thus, wild birds, wild
beasts, fish in rivers or in the sea, belong to nobody until they are captured, when they
become, as a rule, the property of the captor .... As long as he keeps possession of them
his property in them continues; but should they escape completely out of his possession
they are again res nullius, and will become the property of the first person who recaptures
them." STRAHAN, supra note 192, at 3.
198. LOCKE, supra note 193, at 17.
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during the same period and thereafter. 199 For instance, while
Austin was willing to restrict property to things, he could not
ascribe proprietary interest to the human body except by way of
analogy: "I have a right in my own person which is analogous to
the right of property in a determinate thing."200 Even the reified
perspective of property offers no consensus that a human body or
tissue could be the subject of property.
201
A view of property restricted to physical things was bound to
be unworkable in a dynamic and modern society where technology
development tremendously pushed the frontiers of property
beyond its objectified conception. 20 2 This era witnessed new forms
of property, which were intellectual creations and knowledge-
based.
203
Biomedical inventions and research materials, such as
gametes, cell lines and tissue samples that take physical form,
prove that the reified perspective of property offers the greatest
protection to a deserving plaintiff.20 4 This protection is not
available under the "bundle of rights" perspective. 20 5 The courts,
in a good number of cases, have resorted to this conception of
property when human tissue is involved.
20 6
Historically, the reified perspective of property was applied to
199. JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 171-172 (Appleton
1887). "The essential principle of property being to assure to all persons what they have
produced by their labor and accumulated by their abstinence, this principle cannot apply
to what is not the produce of labor, the raw material of the earth." Id. Further, he
observed, "The institution of property, when limited to its essential elements, consists in
the recognition, in each person, of a right to the exclusive disposal of what he or she have
produced by their own exertions, or received either by gift or by fair agreement, without
force or fraud, from those who produced it.. .together with his right to give this to any
other person if he chooses, and the right of that other to receive and enjoy it." Id.
200. See AUSTIN, supra note 194, at 7; See also STRAHAN, supra note 192, at 4.
"Physical objects alone, then, are subjects of ownership. But all physical objects cannot be
owned. For example, there cannot by English law be any property in a human body, living
or dead, though the executors of a dead testator are entitled to possession of his body for
the purpose of burial .... With this exception, however, it may be said generally that any
material thing of which physical possession can be taken, may be owned." Id.
201. Id.
202. See generally MILL, supra note 199.
203. Lester Thurow, Globalization: The Product of a Knowledge-Based Economy, 570
THE ANNALS 19 (2000).
204. Kojo Yelpaala, Owning the Secret of Life: Biotechnology and Property Rights
Revisited, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 111, 154 (2000).
205. See STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 22-23 (Jules Coleman ed.,
1990).
206. See, e.g., Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 1991).
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purely physical and non-human objects of property.20 7 Courts have
recently applied this view to biomedical technology, which created
new forms of property. 20 8 These cases show judicial ingenuity by
adapting a legal concept cast in different historical circumstances
to present day economic and scientific realities. 20 9
In Cornelio v. Stamford Hospital,210 the plaintiff brought an
action in detinue to recover possession of a pathology slide that
contained the tissue sample used in testing her for cancer.211 She
alleged that the tissue sample was her property and was wrongly
detained by the defendant. 212 Although the case was decided using
a Connecticut statute and the plaintiff was not entitled to her non-
duplicable medical record, 213 the majority assumed that the
plaintiff had a property interest in her body tissue. 214 The dissent
was far more eager to find a property interest in the plaintiff's
body tissue as a privacy interest endangered by biomedical science
and technology.2
15
In Janicki v. Hospital of St. Raphael,216 the plaintiffs brought
action after their stillborn fetus was dissected against their
expressed wishes. 217 The court held that a nineteen-week-old
stillborn fetus was neither property nor mere tissue; rather it
occupied a position of special respect entitled to legal
protection.218 The court applied the concept of quasi-property and
property-like analysis to award damages to the mother.219
Similarly, the court in Green v. Southern Transplant
Service220 held that the deceased's mother, stepfather, and siblings
had a cause of action for the unauthorized harvesting of the
deceased's bone and tissue. It is unclear, however, what type of
theoretical analysis the court proffered.221
207. Litowitz, supra note 190.
208. Yelpaala, supra note 204, at 113.
209. See Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 480-82.
210. Cornelio v. Stamford Hosp., 717 A.2d 140 (Conn. 1998).
211. Id. at 142.
212. Id. at 143.
213. Id. at 148.
214. Id. at 143-44.
215. See id. at 149-50.
216. Janicki v. Hosp. of St. Raphael, 744 A. 2d 963 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999).
217. Id. at 964.
218. Id. at 971.
219. Id. at 967-70.
220. Green v. S. Transplant Serv., 698 So. 2d 699 (1997).
221. Id. at 701-02.
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In United States v. Arora,222 the personal animosity between
two scientists employed by the National Institute of Health
reached its peak when one of them maliciously destroyed cultured
human cells produced by the other.223 The United States brought a
civil action for conversion against the delinquent researcher.
224
The court, using a pure property analysis, held that the cell, though
a product of a living body, was property capable of conversion:
The court thus sees no reason why a cell line should not be
considered a chattel capable of being converted. Indeed, if such
a cause of action is not recognized, it is hard to conceive what
civil remedy would ever lie to recover a cell line that might be
stolen or destroyed, including one with immense potential
commercial value, as this one apparently had and has.
225
These cases illustrate the court's reluctance in protecting the
body, tissue and sentiment of the dead by extending the
application of a property concept grounded in common law. This
protection is imperative because of the now intense demand for
human body parts and tissues by biomedical and scientific
researchers. 226 As a result of this demand, an outrageous trend
exists where crematory and mortuary officials are becoming major
merchants in body organs illegally harvested from cadavers,
227
with researchers, biomedical research companies and scientists as
ready buyers.2
28
This judicial inclination toward protection was evident in
Moore v. Regents of the University of California.229 The plaintiff
underwent a splenectomy for the treatment of hairy-cell
leukemia. 230 In the course of treatment, his physician, also a
researcher, noticed that the plaintiff had unique cells that were
valuable for scientific research.231 The physician appropriated the
plaintiff's excised cells and, under the guise of treatment, obtained
222. United States v. Arora, 860 F. Supp. 1091 (D. Md. 1994).
223. Id. at 1092.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1099.
226. See Ronald Campbell et al., Researchers' Use of Bodies Stirs Emotion,
Controversy, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 21, 2000, at A37.
227. See Chiistensen v. Super. Ct., 820 P.2d 181 (Cal. 1991).
228. Perry, supra note 3.
229. Moore v. Regents of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
230. Id. at 481.
231. Id.
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more cell samples from the plaintiff.232 The physician, along with
his associates, used the plaintiff's cells to produce a cell line with
enormous potential for producing therapeutic and pharmaceutical
products.23
3
Among other causes of action, the plaintiff brought an action
for conversion of his bodily materials.234 The plaintiff's conversion
argument could only succeed if he could establish a property
interest in his bodily materials.235 In view of the clandestine nature
of his physician's activity, the case cried out loudly for justice. The
court, using the reified perspective of property, held:
Plaintiff's spleen, which contained certain cells, was something
over which plaintiff enjoyed the unrestricted right to use,
control and disposition. The rights of dominion over one's own
body, and the interests one has therein, are recognized in many
cases. These rights and interests are so akin to property
interests that it would be a subterfuge to call them something
else.236 (emphasis added)
As desirable as this view is, it is still open to criticism. If
property in one's body is based on control and dominion, we may
revert to early civilization when one could have human property
by sheer force, control, domination or subjugation.
The Moore court, like John Locke, realized this undesirable
situation and limited the property right to one in which every
person has a property interest in only his or her own body.237 This
fear of commodification or objectification, much as it is legitimate
and potentially realizable, does not seem compelling enough to
mitigate against a finding of property in the human body.238 In
fact, "propertization" of the human body may be an effective way
to check unauthorized harvesting of human organs and prevent
commodification. 239 We saw this reasoning in the Arora case.240
Critics of the reified view argue it is absurd. If control and
dominion over a thing is a sufficient basis for acquiring property,
why does person A have no property interest in person B when
232. Id.
233. Id. at 481 n.2.
234. Id. at 482 n.4.
235. Id. at 488-89.
236. Id. at 505.
237. Id. at 504.
238. Id.
239. United States v. Arora, 860 F. Supp. 1091, 1099 (D. Md. 1994).
240. Id.
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person B is under the control and dominion of person A? This
apparent absurdity is justified by the compelling interest of giving
heightened protection to the human body and its privacy interests
when those interests are capable of invasion by recent biomedical
technology. 241 In this regard, logical consistency should bow to
socio-economic and scientific realities.
For policy reasons, the California Supreme Court held in
Moore that the plaintiff did not have a conversion claim. 242 The
court was concerned about the negative impact on scientific
activities of public importance.243 The court, however, anticipated
the possibility of a future decision in favor of property interests in
one's own body.244 It stated that the plaintiff in Moore established
a cause of action based on lack of informed consent. 245 The
dissent, however, stated that the plaintiff established a property
interest in his body based on this exercise of control and
dominion. 2
46
Disputes over frozen embryos, pre-embryos or sperm
illustrate interesting applications of the reified perspective of
property to biological materials.247 In Hecht v. Superior Court,
24 8
the deceased's partner, in attempting to posthumously procreate,
sought judicial assistance to release the deceased's cryogenically
preserved sperm to the plaintiff.249 The deceased's children
opposed the release of their father's sperm, arguing it is against
public policy to artificially inseminate a single woman with a
deceased's sperm for posthumous procreation.250
The court held that there was no such public policy.251
Because the dispute was litigated in probate court, where
jurisdiction is mainly limited to a decedent's property,252 the court
determined whether it had jurisdiction over the deceased's
sperm. 253 The court reasoned that because the deceased had
241. Rao, supra note 99, at 368.
242. Moore, 793 P.2d at 497.
243. Id. at 487-88.
244. Id. at 493.
245. Id. at 483.
246. Id. at 500-03.
247. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d. 588 (Tenn. 1992).
248. Hecht v. Super. Ct., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 275 (Ct. App. 1993).
249. Id. at 276.
250. Id. at 284.
251. Id. at 287-89.
252. Id. at 280.
253. Id. at 281.
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authority over his sperm during his lifetime, the sperm was
property. 254 The court further stated that the decedent's frozen
sperm was a "unique type of 'property,"' and therefore part of his
estate.25
5
In Hecht, the court made a conscious effort to expand an
existing category of property to include a new form of property,
such as genetic or reproductive material. 256 Hecht also endorsed
the earlier case of Davis v. Davis,257 holding that a couple's
decision-making authority over the disposition of pre-embryos was
based on property interests.
258
The above decisions, notwithstanding the defects of the
reified perspective of property, are justified by the imperatives of
this biomedical age. The reified perspective of property is again
used in the Supreme Court of Western Australia case of Roche v.
Douglas.259 The case was a paternity suit where the plaintiff
applied for a DNA analysis of the deceased's tissue sample.260 The
success of the plaintiff's application turned on whether the
deceased's body tissue qualified as property.261
The court noted that most British and Australian decisions
concerning dead bodies were inapplicable because they did not
account for recent biomedical technology, such as DNA
techniques.262 The court stated that, in addition to the procedural
advantages of finding a proprietary interest in the deceased's tissue
(i.e., saving in time, cost and quantum of evidence), "it defies
reason to not regard tissue samples as property. Such samples have
a real physical presence. They exist and will continue to exist until
some step is taken to effect destruction. There is no purpose to be
served in ignoring physical reality." 263
254. Id.
255. Id. at 283.
256. Id. at 290-91.
257. Id. at 281; see also Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
258. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597.
259. Roche v. Douglas (2000) WASC 146, http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/
wa/WASC/2000/146.html (June 7,2000).
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.; see also Sharon McEldowney & Lynda M. Warren, The New Biology: A
Challenge to Law, 1 INT'L J. BIOSCIENCES & L. 315 (1998).
263. Roche v. Douglas (2000) WASC 146, http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/
wa/WASC/2000/146.html (June 7,2000).
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B. Bundle of Rights Perspective
Property has increasingly been recognized as a bundle of
rights.264 These rights or interests recognized as property are often
intangible and may include intellectual property rights, the right of
way,265 the duty not to dilute the salinity level in water above one's
leased sea bed 266 and the right of access to a navigable river.267 In
the U.S. Supreme Court case of Scranton v. Wheeler,268 Justice
Shiras observed: "The term "property," standing alone, includes
everything that is the subject of ownership. It is a nomen
generalissium extending to every species of valuable right and
interest, including things real and personal, easements, franchises,
and other incorporeal hereditaments."
269
Property encompasses a great variety of intangible rights and
interests.270 The greatest exercise of these rights is what constitutes
ownership. 271 As Jackson observed: "A synonym for a proprietary
interest is "ownership," which, however, is sometimes said to
describe the highest possible such [sic] interest rather than the
concept in general." 272
Identifying property as representative of a bundle of rights,
however, does not solve the definitional problem. Does every
piece in the bundle of rights qualify as property? A person may
have some interest or right in his or her body, but does that body
qualify as property? These questions require an inquisition into
the nature and prerequisites of a "right" of property.
C. Nature of Proprietary Interests and Rights
For a right to come within the realm of property, it must
possess a particular nature, (such as be identifiable, transferable,
devisable and have monetary value) 273 otherwise the right does
not legally qualify as property.274 The famous exposition of this
264. DAVID C. JACKSON, PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW 10 (Law Book Co., Ltd.
1967); See also BRUCE ZIFF, PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW 1-3 (1993).
265. See Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525 (1996).
266. See Avenal v. United States, 100 F.3d 933 (1996).
267. See Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 U.S. 497 (1870).
268. Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900).
269. Id. at 170.
270. See JACKSON, supra note 264, at 10-11.
271. Id. at 11 n.21.
272. Id. at 11 (citations omitted).
273. Id. at 1248.
274. Nat'l Provincial Bank, Ltd. v. Ainsworth, A.C. 1175, 1247-1248 (H.L. 1965).
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principle remains Lord Wilberforce's dictum in National
Provincial Bank Ltd. v. Ainsworth.
275
In Ainsworth, a deserted wife remained on the matrimonial
property that was mortgaged by her husband to a bank. 276 She
argued that being the mortgagor's wife gave her an interest in the
matrimonial property even though it was legally owned by her
husband. 277 She claimed that this interest was sufficient to override
the bank's legal mortgage. 278 Thus, the case turned on the nature
of the property interest asserted by the wife. Lord Wilberforce
de-clared:
Before a right or an interest can be admitted into the category
of property, or of a right affecting property, it must be
definable, identifiable by third parties, capable in its nature of
assumption by third parties, and have some degree of
permanence or stability. The wife's right has none of these
qualities, it is characterized by the reverse of them.
279
The above reasoning does not stand alone, as it has been
applied in other jurisdictions and is supported by academic
writers. 280 In First Victoria National Bank v United States,281 the
court observed:
An interest labeled 'property' normally may possess certain
characteristics: it can be transferred to others; it can be devised
and inherited; it can descend to heirs at law; it can be levied
upon to satisfy a judgment; it comes under the jurisdiction of a
bankruptcy court in a bankruptcy proceeding; it will be
protected against invasion by the courts; it cannot be taken
away without due process of law.
28 2
The court added a caveat to the otherwise settled proposition
on the nature of property interests:
An interest may qualify as 'property' for some purposes even
275. Id. at 1175.
276. Id. at 1176.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 1247-48.
280. See JACKSON, supra note 264, at 16 (stating "The distinction between proprietary
and personal interests may be said to rest either on whether or not the holder is given the
ability: (i) to 'deal with' the interest by transferring it to another, or (ii) to recover the
interest should he lose it, or (iii) bring an action with respect to the interest against a
person or persons other than the grantor.").
281. First Victoria Nat'l Bank v. United States, 620 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1980).
282. Id. at 1103-04.
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though it lacks some of these attributes. For example, an
individual can have a 'property' right in his job ... so that he
cannot be fired without appropriate procedural safeguards; yet
the job is not assignable, transferable, descendible, or devisable.
The 'right to publicity' is transferable during life.. .but may not
be devisable.
283
It seems the most lucid application of the Ainsworth principle
is shown by cases dealing with the property status of university
degrees. 284 This often arises in a divorce situation where a spouse
asserts that a university degree or professional qualification
acquired by the other spouse during the marriage is community
property subject to division upon the dissolution of marriage.
285
In the Canadian case of Berghofer v. Berghofer,286 the Court
of the Queen's Bench, relying on the earlier Ontario High Court
decision of Caratun v. Caratun,287 held that a university degree
obtained during the marriage of the couple was an asset that
should be considered in an action under the Matrimonial Property
Act.288 This was notwithstanding the fact that a university degree,
by its intrinsic nature, does not possess the factors stipulated by
the court in the Ainsworth case.
289
Beyond relying upon the decision in Caratun, the court did
not provide any theoretical anchorage for holding that a university
degree qualified as property. 290 Furthermore, the precedential
value of that decision is almost nil because it was overruled.
291
Another case that ascribed proprietary value to a university
degree, though it is not transferable, is Woodworth v.
Woodworth.292 The issue was whether the plaintiff's law degree
was marital property subject to distribution.293  The case
confronted the social and economic realities of a wife who gave
her husband moral support and stood by him in the course of his
283. Id. at 1104.
284. See Wilbur M. Roadhouse, The Problem of the Professional Spouse: Should an
Educational Degree Earned During Marriage Constitute Property in Arizona?, 24 ARIZ.
L. REv. 963 (1982).
285. Id. at 963-65.
286. Berghofer v. Berghofer, [1988] Alta. L.R.2d 186.
287. Caratun v. Caratun, [1987] D.L.R. 398 (Can.).
288. Berghofer, Alta. L.R.2d at 188.
289. Ainsworth, A.C. at 1247-48.
290. Berghofer, Alta. L.R.2d at 188.
291. Caratun v. Caratun, [1993] D.L.R. 404, 414-15 (Can.).
292. Woodworth v. Woodworth, 337 N.W.2d 332 (Mich. 1983).
293. Id. at 333.
2002]
Loy. L.A. Intl & Comp. L. Rev.
studies. The court observed:
Plaintiff contends that his law degree is not such a marital asset.
We disagree.
The facts reveal that plaintiff's law degree was the end product
of a concerted family effort. Both parties planned their family
life around the effort to attain plaintiff's degree. Toward this
end, the family divided the daily tasks encountered in living.
While the law degree did not preempt all other facets of their
lives, it did become the main focus and goal of their activities.
Plaintiff left his Job in Joncsville and t e fa- relocte t
Detroit so that plaintiff could attend law school. In Detroit,
defendant sought and obtained full time employment to support
the family.
We conclude, therefore, that plaintiff's law degree was the
result of mutual sacrifice and effort by both plaintiff and
defendant. While plaintiff studied and attended classes,
defendant carried her share of the burden as well as sharing
vicariously in the stress of the experience known as the "paper
chase". [sic]
We believe that fairness dictates that the spouse who did not
earn an advanced degree be compensated whenever the
advanced degree is the product of such concerted family
investment. The degree holder has expended great effort to
obtain the degree not only for him or herself, but also to benefit
the family as a whole. The spouse has shared in this effort and
contributed in other ways as well, not merely as a gift to the
student spouse nor merely to share individually in the benefits
but to help the marital unit as a whole.
294
It is evident that this view does not make any conceptual
analysis of property before holding that a university degree
qualified as such. The court, in characterizing a university degree
as property, without subjecting it to a strict application of the
concept of property, was primarily concerned with preventing a
miscarriage of justice.295 But justice was achieved by a
misconception and misapplication of the concept of property.
Moreover, Berghofer296 and Woodworth297 are completely
294. Id. at 334.
295. Id. at 335.
296. Berghofer, 11 A.C.W.S. at 29.
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limited by other cases holding the contrary.298 In Caratun,299 it was
argued that a dental license acquired by a spouse in the course of
the marriage was property for the purpose of the Family Law Act.
The Ontario Court of Appeal overruled the decision of the trial
court and observed:
One of the traditional indicia of property is its inherent
transferability. That transferability may, of course, be precluded
either by law or contract. In contrast, the right or licence to
practise a particular profession is by its very nature a right
personal to the holder, incapable of transfer.... [r]ights or
things which are inherently non-transferable, such as the right
to practise a profession, clearly do not constitute property in
any traditional sense.
300
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Colorado case of In re
Marriage of Graham30 1 observed:
An educational degree, such as an M.B.A., is simply not
encompassed even by the broad views of the concept of
'property.' It does not have an exchange value or any objective
transferable value on an open market. It is personal to the
holder and is not inheritable .... It cannot be assigned, sold,
transferred, conveyed, or pledged. An advanced degree is a
cumulative product of many years of previous education,
combined with diligence and hard work. It may not be acquired
by the mere expenditure of money. It is simply an intellectual
achievement that may potentially assist in the future acquisition
of property. In our view, it has none of the attributes of
property in the usual sense of that term.
302
Thus, in order to qualify as property, the object must be
assignable, transferable and capable of being sold or pledged or
reasonably permanent and identifiable. 30 3 The question, for the
297. Woodworth, 337 N.W.2d at 332.
298. See Lesman v. Lesman, 452 N.Y.S.2d 935 (App. Div. 1982); Mahoney v.
Mahoney, 442 A.2d. 1062 (N.J. App. Div. 1982); Wisner v. Wisner, 631 P.2d 115 (Ariz.
1981); Frausto v. Frausto, 611 S.W.2d 656. (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); Nastrom v. Nastrom, 262
N.W.2d 487 (N.D. 1978); Muckleroy v. Muckleroy, 498. P.2d 1335 (N.M. 1972); Todd v.
Todd, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969); In re Marriage of Sullivan, 184 Cal. Rptr. 796
(Cal. Ct. App. 1982); In re Marriage of Goldstein, 423 N.E.2d 1201 (Il1. App. Ct. 1981); In
re Marriage of McManama, 399 N.E.2d 371 (Ind. 1980).
299. Caratun, D.L.R. at 404.
300. Id. at 409-10.
301. In re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d 75 (Colo. 1978).
302. Id. at 77.
303. Id.
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purposes of this article, then becomes: does a human tissue, body
or corpse satisfy the above requirements? Obviously, the answer is
no, if the Ainsworth principle is applied and a blind eye is turned
to scientific and economic realities.
This appears to be the approach taken by the Supreme Court
of Colorado in Culpepper v. Pearl St. Bldg Inc.30 4 The plaintiffs'
deceased son was mistakenly cremated by the defendant. 30 5 The
success of the plaintiffs' claim, which included damages for
conversion of the deceased's body, 30 6 depended on whether the
plaintiffs could show a property interest in their dead son's
body. 30
7
The court dismissed the claim on the basis that the plaintiffs
had no property interest in their son's corpse.30 8 The court
explained that a dead body is not commercially transferable, has
no monetary value and, therefore, is not property.30 9 The measure
of damages for conversion depends on the market value of the
converted good,310 which, in a corpse, is unascertainable.
311
Therefore, the Ainsworth principle excludes property in dead
human bodies or living body tissues because they inherently lack
the indicia of property.
312
D. Ainsworth's Case and Biomedical Technology
The proposition in Ainsworth was cast in the mold of
common law during a period that had not witnessed the
tremendous biotechnological advances of today.313 Marketability
and commercial transferability are no longer the touchstones of an
object's value. This partly explains why common law does not
recognize corpses as property. But times have changed and
common law has not caught up with the realities of today.
First, corpses, once thought to be intrinsically non-
transferable or commercially unviable have now acquired
pecuniary value as important raw materials in biomedical
304. Culpepper, 877 P.2d 877 (Colo. 1994).
305. Id.
306. Id. at 879.
307. Id. at 880.
308. Id. at 882.
309. Id. at 880.
310. Id. at 882 n.6.
311. Id.
312. Nat'l Provincial Bank, A.C. at 1247-48.
313. Onyeanusi, 952 F.2d at 792.
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research. 314 Second, though human body parts may be considered
intrinsically non-commodifiable, biomedical technology has
jeopardized their safety315 such that substantial legal protection,
analogous to the protection given to property, is now desirable. 316
For the law to serve society as an instrument of social engineering,
it must be able to respond meaningfully to changing socio-
economic dynamics.317 The law has shown this adaptability and
flexibility in the past by acknowledging a property interest in one's
job or personality.31
8
Mary Glendon319  chronicled the socio-economic
considerations underpinning the movement toward property rights
in one's job and the judicial recognition of such rights.320 Since the
1970s, there has been a significant increase in the number of
people employed.321 These people's lives depend on wages and
other employment benefits. For many, salary and employment
benefits have come to represent wealth and economic security.
Glendon argues that to maintain this new status, the law should
ensure reasonable stability in employment remains. 322
The movement toward property rights in one's job
contributed to the limitations on the employer's right to arbitrarily
terminate an employee's employment in the United States and in
many other countries.323 Many courts facilitated the needed
protection by defining employee rights as property.324 Thus, an
employee had a property interest in his or her job, not because it
314. Id. In another case, it was held that a corpse satisfied the criteria of ownership, in
that it could be the subject of custody, control and disposition by the next of kin.
Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 56 A. 878, 879-80 (Pa. 1907).
315. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 481 (Cal. 1990) (discussing an
incident where body tissue was taken from a patient without his consent for use in
biomedical research); Christensen, 820 P.2d at 181 (discussing a biomedical company
engaged in illegal trade on cadaver organs); R. v. Stillman, [1997] S.C.R. 607, 609 (1997)
(discussing the situation where police authorities obtained a detainee's mucous tissue,
without his consent, for DNA testing).
316. E.g., Cornelio v. Stamford Hosp., 717 A.2d 140, 149 (Conn. 1998) (McDonald, J.,
dissenting).
317. Moore, 793 P.2d at 507.
318. Donald H. J. Herman & Yvonne S. Sor, Property Rights In One's Job: The Case
For Limiting Employment-At-Will, 24 ARIZ. L. REV. 763, 780 (1982).
319. MARY A. GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY, 101-245
(1981).
320. Id. at 143-70.
321. See id.
322. Id. at 163.
323. Id. at 150-53.
324. Herman et al., supra note 318, at 778-80.
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was transferable, but rather to synchronize the law with the
economic realities of employment.325
At present, the main source of wealth for biotech companies
is knowledge. 326 Raw materials for biomedical research include
cells and tissue samples.327 Biomedical research has contributed to
the health and social well-being of society.328 To maintain social
value,329 the law should provide sufficient and balanced protection
to the raw materials and products of biomedical research. 330 The
law has already allowed patent protection to biological products,
previously thought to be unpatentable. 33
1
For example, in Diamond v. Chakrabarty,332 the court held
that genetically engineered bacteria was patentable. Furthermore,
in President and Fellows of Harvard College v. Canada
(Commissioner of Patents),333 the court held that an oncomouse, a
transgenic non-human mammal genetically engineered for use in
cancer studies, was patentable.334 These two cases reveal an effort
by the courts in Canada and the United States to align the law with
the present realities of science and everyday life.
335
These recent decisions show that Ainsworth does not provide
an immutable criteria for property336 and applying such a rule is
counterproductive to biological forms of property. Therefore,
325. Id.
326. Yelpaala, supra note 204, at 154.
327. Id. at 154-155.
328. Id. at 119.
329. Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., What Makes Clinical Research Ethical?, 283 JAMA
2701, 2703 (2000).
330. See United States v. Arora, 860 F. Supp. 1091, 1099 (4th Cir. 1994).
331. Id.
332. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
333. Pres. & Fellows of Harv. College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [2000]
D.L.R. 385.
334. Id. at 400.
335. See generally Diamond, 447 U.S. 303.
336. Jeremy Waldron drew a distinction between a 'concept' and a 'conception' of
property. Waldron, supra note 189, at 340. Alienability was not part of the concept of
property, and therefore, might not be recognized by a particular legal system's conception
of property: "The concept of ownership is the very abstract idea described in section 5: a
correlation between individual names and particular objects, such that the decision of the
person whose name is on the object about what should be done with that object is taken as
socially conclusive. The detailed rules of particular legal systems (whether real or
imaginary) assigning rights, liberties, powers, immunities and liabilities to people in regard
to particular resources amount to conceptions of that abstract concept. They indicate ways
in which the abstract idea of ownership has been or may be realized concretely in
particular societies." (italics in the original). Id.
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whether a corpse or human tissue qualifies as property ought not
to depend solely on its intrinsic monetary value or allied
considerations, but on the social, economic and privacy
considerations raised by biomedical technology. This raises the
question of whether the court should articulate a full property
interest in the human body.
IV. SUGGESTED ROUTES TO FINDING A PROPERTY INTEREST IN
THE HUMAN BODY
It is possible for courts to find the existence of a property
interest in a corpse or tissue by drawing analogies from various
areas of law where similar rights are firmly established. Courts
have found, in some instances, that property interests do exist in a
corpse or in bodily materials such as cells.337
A. Autonomy and the Right to Bodily Self-Determination
When examining situations where courts have enforced a
person's right to bodily self-determination, it is apparent that
courts have indirectly enforced rights similar to property rights. It
is well settled that an individual has authority over his or her body
and the right to determine what is done to it.
338
This principle of bodily self-determination is best exemplified
in the context of the physician-patient relationship.339 Except in
the case of emergency or statutory authorization, medical
intervention may only be undertaken with the consent of the
patient; otherwise, the physician is liable for battery. 34° Even when
consent is given, the physician has a duty to give the patient
adequate information on all the potential and likely risks of
medical intervention.341 A breach of this duty may result in a claim
for negligence or medical malpractice.342
The common law right of a patient to consent to treatment
also includes a right to refuse or withdraw from medical
treatment.343 This right is now constitutionally protected. 344 Thus,
337. See generally White, supra note 4.
338. Schleondorff v. N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E.2d 92,93 (N.Y. 1914).
339. Id.
340. See id.; Parmley v. Parmley, [1945] D.L.R. 81; Marshall v. Curry, [1933] D.L.R.
260.
341. Reibl v. Hughes, [1981] D.L.R. 1.
342. Id.
343. Ciarlariello v. Schacter, [1993] S.C.R. 119.
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a patient may legally refuse life-saving treatment even when death
is imminent. 345 Therefore, it may be argued that Canadian law
permits a person to terminate his or her life by foregoing life-
saving treatment. In other words, disease naturally causes the
resultant death.346 The patient has a choice to either be treated or
abstain from treatment. The latter is a deliberate termination of
life.
The current debate on the legality of euthanasia and assisted-
suicide makes the foregoing analogy clearer. 347 In R. v. Latimer,
348
the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed the illegality of
euthanasia. 349 For compassionate reasons, Robert Latimer killed
his mentally and physically debilitated twelve-year-old daughter
who suffered from cerebral palsy.350 He was convicted of second-
degree murder.351  He unsuccessfully challenged the
constitutionality of the Canadian Criminal Code as imposing an
inhuman and degrading treatment.352 U.S. law is similar,353 though
the state of Oregon allows assisted suicide for mentally
344. Krischer v. Mclver, 697 So. 2d 91, 102 (Fla. 1997); Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept.
of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2842 (1990); Rodriguez v. A.G. of Canada, [1993] S.C.R. 519,
587-89.
345. Malette v. Shulman, [1990] O.R.2d 417, 424 (discussing where the patient was
entitled to refuse a medically necessary blood transfusion, even though the refusal was
based on her religious belief).
346. There is a fruitful judicial and juristic distinction of the difference between
causation and intent or between refusal of treatment and assisted suicide. Amy L. Jerdee,
Breaking Through The Silence: Minnesota's Pregnancy Presumption And The Right To
Refuse Medical Treatment, 84 MINN. L. Rev. 971, 986 (2000); David Orentlicher, The
Alleged Distinction Euthanasia and the Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment:
Conceptually Incoherent and Impossible to Maintain, 3 U. ILL. L. Rev. 837 (1998); Trudo
Lemmens, Towards the Right to be Killed? Treatment Refusal, Assisted Suicide and
Euthanasia in the United States and Canada, 52 BRIT. MED. BULL. 341 (1996); Gilmore v.
Finn, 527 S.E.2d 426, 434 (Va. 2000); Wash. v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997); Vaco v.
Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997); Nancy B. v. Hotel-Dieu de Quebe, [1992] C.C.C. 450.
347. For an overview of jurisdictional attitudes: Barney Sneiderman & Marja Verhoef,
Patient Autonomy And The Defense of Medical Necessity: Five Dutch Euthanasia Cases,
34 ALTA. L. REV. 374 (1996); P. S. Florencio & R. H. Keller, End-of-Life Decision
Making: Rethinking the Principles of Fundamental Justice in the Context of Emerging
Empirical Data, 7 HEALTH L. J. 233 (1999).
348. R. v. Latimer, [2001] D.L.R. 577.
349. Id. at 585.
350. Id. at 579.
351. Id.
352. Barney Sneiderman, The Case of Robert Latimer: A Commentary on Crime and
Punishment, 37 ALTA. L. REV. 1017 (1999) (criticizing the sentence at the Court of
Appeals stage).
353. Glucksberg, 17 S. Ct. at 2258; Vaco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
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incompetent persons who come within the terms of the law.3 54 It is
estimated that twenty-seven people died in 2000 under Oregon's
Death With Dignity Act.
355
Notwithstanding the prohibition on assisted-suicide and
euthanasia, the law, by resorting to nuances, allows deliberate
termination of life. For instance, if a physician prescribes a lethal
overdose of medication, with the intent to alleviate unremitting
pain, it is not murder, even though it results in death.356 This is
euphemistically called palliative care.357 In some instances, a
physician is allowed to place a do-not-resuscitate order for a
patient in a persistent vegetative state when, in the physician's
opinion, treatment becomes futile.
358
The courts have maintained that a rational distinction exists
between a refusal of life-saving treatment that may result in death,
and assisted suicide.359 It has been suggested that both are
instances of semantic detoxification and masking the murderous
intent.360 The law has wittingly or unwittingly allowed the
devaluation and objectification of human life.
361
In McFall v. Shimp,362 the plaintiff needed a bone marrow
transplant to survive.363 The defendant was the plaintiff's cousin
354. Death With Dignity Act, ORE. REV. STAT. § 127.800 (1997) available at
http://www.ohd.hr.state.or.us/chs/pas/pas.htm. A constitutional challenge of the statute, in
Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1997), failed for lack. of standing. Daniel Avila,
Assisted Suicide and the Inalienable Right to Life, 16 IL&M 111 (2000) (discussing
potential public status injury inflicted on some people by the Act).
355. Peter Goodspeed, Death on Demand, NAT'L POST (Can.), Apr. 3,2001 at All.
356. James Goss, A Postscript to the Trial of Dr. David Moor, 2000 CRIM. L. REV.
568; Anthony Arlidge, The Trial of Dr. David Moor, 2000 CRIM. L. REV. 31; J. C. Smith,
comment, A Comment on Moor's Case, 2000 CRIM. L. REV. 41; Alec Samuels, The
Doctor, the Patient, and Easing the Passing: The Law, 68 MEDIcO-LEGAL J. 38 (2000).
357. Goss, supra note 356, at 570.
358. Child & Family Services of Central Manitoba v. Lavallee, [1997] D.L.R. 409;
Sawatzky v. Riverview Health Ctr., Inc., [19981 D.L.R. 358; Airedale Nat'l Health Serv.
Trust v. Bland, 1 All E.R. 821 (1993); Barney Sneiderman, Comment, A Do Not
Resuscitate Order For An Infant Against Parental Wishes: A Comment on the Case of
Child and Family Services of Central Manitoba v. R.L. and S.L.H., 7 HEALTH L. J. 205
(1999).
359. See generally Avila, supra note 354.
360. Adam J. Hildebrand, Masked Intentions: The Masquerade of Killing Thoughts
Used to Justify Dehydrating and Starving People in a "Persistent Vegetative State" and
People with Other Profound Neurological Impairments, 16 INT'L L. & MED. 143 (2000).
361. See generally Avila, supra note 354.
362. McFall v. Shimp. 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (1978).
363. Id. at 90.
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and refused to donate the matching bone marrow.3 64 The
plaintiff's action to compel the donation under a mandatory
injunction failed.365 The court implicitly recognized a type of
property right in the defendant's bone marrow, in holding that the
plaintiff's organs could not be harvested without his consent.366
Similarly, in R v. Stillman,367 the Supreme Court of Canada held
that it was not permissible for the police to surreptitiously obtain a
mucous sample of a detainee for DNA analysis. 368 As such, these
cases enforced property-like protections. A full and conscious
recognition of property rights in the human body may help balance
the competing interests of the sanctity of life with the specter of
commodification.
B. Transformation of a Corpse or Human Tissue by Work and
Skill
Australian courts have crystallized an exception, first
enunciated in 1908,369 that an expenditure of labor on a corpse
deserves property protection.370 This seems to be a judicial
recognition of John Locke's 371 and Stuart Mill's 372 theses, which
state that products of a person's labor are property of that
person.373
In Doodeward v. Spence,374 which involved a right to the
possession of a double-headed stillborn fetus, the High Court of
Australia, observed:
364. Id.
365. Id. at 92.
366. Guido Calabresi, Do We Own Our Bodies?, 1 HEALTH MATRIX 5 (1991)
(commenting on cases with a presumption that there is a property right in one's body).
367. R. v. Stillman, [1997] S.C.R. 607.
368. Id. The majority reasoned that the mucous sample was not abandoned since it
was obtained in the context of detention, and against the explicit prior refusal of the
defendant to give bodily samples. Id. at 675. It was therefore conscripted evidence. Id.
Nevertheless, the court held that the mucous sample was discoverable through an
alternative non-conscriptive means, and was obtained with minimal breach of the
appellants dignity. Id. On those grounds, the sample was therefore admissible. Id.
369. Doodeward v. Spence, [1908] C.L.R. 406 (referring approvingly to the following
cases: Miner v. C.P.R., [1911] Alta L.R. 409,413; Janicki v. Hosp. of St. Raphael, 744 A.2d
963, 968 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999); Dobson v. N. Tyneside Health Auth., 1 W.L.R. 596, 600
(C.A. 1997); and R. v. Kelly, 3 All E.R. 741 (C.A. 1998)).
370. Doodeward, 6 C.L.R. at 406-07.
371. LOCKE, supra note 193, at 15.
372. MILL, supra note 199, at 172.
373. See generally LOCKE, supra note 193, at 17.
374. Doodeward, 6 C.L.R. at 406.
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I entertain no doubt that, when a person has by the lawful
exercise of work or skill so dealt with a human body or part of a
human body in his lawful possession that it has acquired some
attributes differentiating it from a mere corpse awaiting burial,
he acquires a right to retain possession of it, at least as against
any person not entitled to have it delivered to him for the
purpose of burial, but subject, of course, to any positive law
which forbids its retention under the particular
circumstances. 3
75
For the exception to apply, the initial possession of the dead
body, or any part of it, must be lawful.376 Also, such possession
must not affront public health or decency. 377 Therefore, a
researcher who breaks into a morgue to steal body parts and
scientifically preserves them cannot claim the exception. In R. v.
Kelly,378 the British Court of Appeal held that an artist, who
surreptitiously obtained body parts scientifically preserved at the
Royal College of Surgeons, was guilty of theft.379 Thus, the court
envisaged future legal protection for body parts intended for
transplantation or DNA analysis, even when these parts had not
been subjected to the application of labor and skill.380 It has been
suggested that the Doodeward exception consumes the general no-
property rule in dead bodies.
381
With respect to living body parts, Moore presents a latent
application of the work and skill exception. In Moore, the
plaintiff's excised cell was transformed into a patentable and
lucrative cell line by use of scientific skill and labor.382 The court
held that the patent belonged to the researchers, even though
ownership of the patent was not at issue. 383 One could conclude
that the investment of scientific labor on Moore's cell contributed
to the dismissal of his cause of action for conversion.
C. Utility
Biomedical technology gives corpses and body parts a utility
375. Id. at 414.
376. Id. at 406-07.
377. Id. at 413.
378. R. v. Kelly, 3 All E.R. 741 (C.A. 1998).
379. See generally id.
380. Id. at 750.
381. White, supra note 4, at 167.
382. Id. at 481-82.
383. Id. at 492.
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that was not present when the no-property rule emerged. With the
systematic regulation of anatomy by the British Anatomy Act of
1832, 384 cadavers became profoundly useful for medical training
and anatomical examination. 385 This new use led to a shift in the
attitude of British judges toward human corpses.386 The
observation of Judge Willes remains on point:
[B]ut in modem times the requirements of science are larger
than formerly, and when they are so extensive it seems to me
that we ought not to entertain any prejudice against the
obtaining of dead bodies for the laudable purpose of dissection,
but we ought to look at the matter with a view to utility.387
Today, the utility of a corpse, or parts of it, has transcended
those envisaged by Judge Willes. Body parts are currently being
used in DNA analysis, artistic casts, researching predictive testing
technique for genetic disorders and organ transplants. Thus, the
progressive utility of the human body requires property protection.
D. Characterization Under Certain Statutes
When construing certain statutes, some courts have held that
the human body is an object of property. While these statutes deal
with special circumstances, they are not irrelevant. For example, in
Onyeanusi v. Pan Am,38 8 the Court of Appeals held the plaintiff's
deceased mother qualified as "goods" under The Warsaw
Convention.389 Thus, the plaintiff's delay in giving the required
statutory notice precluded him from recovering damages for the
defendant's nine-day delay in delivering the corpse at the
contracted destination.390 Justice Cowen's observation sets forth
the general principle of this case:
Human remains can have significant commercial value,
although they are not typically bought and sold like other
goods. Medical schools and hospitals commonly use human
cadavers for training and experiments. Human tissue and
organs which are taken from the recently deceased have
inestimable value in transplant operations. Although remains
384. Anatomy Act, 1832,2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 75 (Eng.).
385. See Matthews, supra note 9, at 214-15.
386. R. v. Feist, 169 Eng. Rep. 1132, 1135 (Cr. Cas. 1858).
387. Id.
388. Onyeanusi v. Pan Am, 952 F.2d 788 (3d Cir. 1992).
389. Id. at 792-93.
390. Id. at 793.
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which are used for these medical and scientific purposes are
usually donated, rather than bought and sold, this does not
negate their potential commercial value. Onyeanusi argues that
many states prohibit commerce in human remains or organs.
Notwithstanding the legality of selling some parts of the body,
most notably blood and sperm, we believe these state laws
against organ and tissue sales are premised on moral and
ethical, rather than economic, considerations. In fact, the very
existence of these state laws indicates that there would be a
market for human remains in the absence of government
intervention.
391
As noted above, statutes like The Human Tissue Gift Act,
3 92
Human Organ Transplant Act 39 3 and Uniform Anatomical Gift
Act,3 94 though prohibiting sales in transplantable organs, implicitly
recognize their property-like characteristics. Market transactions
in regenerative body parts like blood,395 hair, fingernails,
toenails396 and bone marrow are already well known, though in the
case of blood it is sometimes regarded as "service" rather than
sale.3
97
Anatomy legislation recognizes that a corpse is property
capable of donation for anatomical examination.398 Donations can
be made by persons who have lawful possession of the corpse or
by the deceased prior to his or her death.399 The first case decided
under the British Anatomy Act of 1832 confirmed this opinion.
400
In R. v. Feist,4° 1 the court observed that, "[tlhe Anatomy Act has
altered the common law, and has rendered the selling of a dead
body for the purpose of dissection lawful under certain
391. Id. at 792. But cf. Bourne v. Norwich Crematorium Ltd., 2 All E.R. 576, 578
(1967) (holding, however, that, "it would be a distortion of the English language to
describe the living or the dead as goods or materials.").
392. Human Tissue Gift Act, R.S.O. ch. H-20 (1990) (Can.).
393. Human Organ Transplant Act, 1989, c. 31 (Eng.).
394. Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 8A U.L.A. 19 (1987).
395. Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 123 N.E.2d 792 (N.Y. 1954); Carter v. Inter-Faith
Hosp. of Queens, 304 N.Y.S.2d 97 (App. Div. 1969).
396. Venner v. Maryland, 354 A.2d 483, 498 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976) (holding that
they are regarded as property).
397. See Rao, supra note 99, at 371-386.
398. See Nigeria's Anatomy Act, 1958, 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 75, c. 11 (which is based on the
English Anatomy Act of 1832).
399. Id.
400. R. v. Feist, 169 Eng. Rep. 1132, 1135 (Cr. Cas. 1858).
401. See id.
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circumstances. '" 40 2  Society has tolerated, in various forms,
ownership of the human body. Therefore, a full judicial
recognition of the human body as a property interest may not be
shocking.
E. Why Not Property in the Human Body?
The most formidable argument against the recognition of a
full property right in the human body is the slippery slope
argument that it would cause devaluation, objectification and
commodification of life.40 3 This argument also surfaces in the
debate on the patenting of human genes.40 4 Some fear that
unconscionable scientists will prey upon vulnerable communities
that possess unique genes.40 5 A market for stem cells, harvested
from fresh embryos, already exists and have been sold for as much
as five thousand dollars.4
0 6
Recently, a newspaper reported that human tissues from a
decommissioned anatomy lab at the University of Toronto were
being sold at an antique auction.40 7 Before condemning anything
that smacks of commodification or objectification of life, note that
a full property interest in the human body provides the surest
safeguard against the concerns raised by advocates of a no-
property regime. 40
8
Some of the issues that arise are how to recover possession
and damages from a person who opens a grave, takes the body,
and refuses to deliver it.40 9 Another issue is what remedies are
available to an organ bank when useful human organs in its
possession are willfully destroyed or stolen. Finally, the question
arises of how a researcher may recover possession of human cells,
402. Id. at 1135.
403. B. Williams, Concepts of Personhood and the Commodification of the Body, 7
HEALTH L. REV. 11 (1998-1999).
404. E. Richard Gold, Patents in Genes, Prepared for the Canadian Biotechnology
Advisory Committee Project Steering Committee on Intellectual Property and the
Patenting of Higher Life Forms, (Dec. 2000), available at http://www.cbac-cccb.ca.
405. Id. at 13, 17-18.
406. Margaret Munro, A Vision of Spare Parts, NAT'L POST (Can.), Mar. 29, 2001, at
A15; Brad Evenson, Door Opened To Research With Embryos, NAT'L POST (Can.), Mar.
30, 2001, at A4.
407. Heather Sokoloff, Human Tissue on Sale at Auction, NAT'L POST (Can.), Apr. 16,
2001, at A4.
408. Skegg, supra note 31, at 229.
409. Keyes v. Konkel, 78 N.W. 649 (Mich. 1899) (holding that right to recover
possession of a corpse was denied).
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lawfully acquired and used in a socially useful activity, from a thief
who has stolen them.410 Similarly, the court in Ritter v. Couch411
asked:
The world does not contain a tribunal that would punish a son
who should resist, even to death, any attempt to mutilate his
father's corpse, or tear it from the grave for sale or dissection;
but where would he find the legal right to resist, except in his
peculiar and exclusive interest in the body?
412
This statement suggests that the best approach is to recognize
a full right of property in the human body and its parts. The state
can enact statutes, similar to those relating to organ transplants, to
deal with specific cases of abuse in property rights, like the sordid
market in body parts existing in developing countries.413 The
state's position on the human body will not differ from the law's
treatment of other items of property because property rights have
always been subject to state interest. Thus, the right to use one's
property as one sees fit does not entitle one to cause a nuisance. In
contrast, the current situation perpetuates injustices.
Recognizing the human body as property may pave the way
for constitutional protection. Such protection was attempted in
Crocker v. Pleasant,414 where plaintiffs claimed that the
defendant's interment of their son, without sufficient notice to
them, was a breach of property under the Fourteenth Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution. 415 The claim failed and the court did not
recognize any property interest in a dead body.416 It appears that
the benefits of allowing a full property right in the human body
outweigh the disadvantages.
V. CONCLUSION
Recent advances in biomedical technology have intensified
the question of property rights in a human body or corpse. Recent
judicial and scholarly opinions tend to support the existence of
property interests in human body tissue or corpses. The dominant
410. United States v. Arora, 860 F. Supp. 1091 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that a cultured
human cell was property).
411. Ritter v. Couch, 76 S.E. 428 (W. Va. 1912).
412. Id. at 430.
413. See Matthews, supra note 9.
414. Crocker v. Pleasant, 717 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 1999).
415. Id. at 1088.
416. Id. at 1089.
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paradigms of property rights do not, however, accommodate the
existence of property interests in the human body. Recognition of
such interests has become imperative due to enormous advances in
science and technology. The courts, in addition to methods already
in use, should find a property interest in a human body by drawing
analogies from areas of law that affirm property rights in the
human body. Enacting statutes can alleviate commodification or
objectification of the human body.
